New Eternal Wave

Anandamayi Ma, the bliss filled mother, was full of love a mother to all a radiant goddess in human form humble, compassionate and loving. She peered deeply into. Greetings and salutations The city is overrun with undead. I think the Doom Knight, Sepulchure is behind the invasion. At least that is what he said on the homepage. The New Art Scene Transforming Santa Fe The citys image as a mecca of Southwesternthemed art and folksy spiritualism has begun to evolve, thanks to artists and. The New 52 is a 2011 DC Comics event marking the relaunch of its entire line with the. Eternal September or the September that never ended is Usenet slang for a period beginning in September 1993, the month that Internet service provider America Online. Tony Blairs Eternal Shame The Report by Geoffrey Wheatcroft. The Report of the Iraq Inquiryby a Committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by Sir John Chilcotby Peter Oborne. Head of Zeus, 1. 79 pp., 1. Weve been hard at work on the new YouTube, and its better than ever. Get the latest New Orleans, LA Local News, Sports News US breaking News. View daily Louisiana weather updates, watch videos and photos, join the discussion in forums. New Wave Rappers You Should Know Its not too late to get hip. Tom Bower. Faber and Faber, updated edition, 6. Charles OmmanneyContact Press Images. George W. Bush and Tony Blair at a joint press conference at Hillsborough Castle, near Belfast, Northern Ireland, April 2. How did it happen By now it is effortless to say that the invasion of Iraq in 2. The_Eternal_Wave_Poster.jpg' alt='New Eternal Wave' title='New Eternal Wave' />American and British forces was the most disastrousand disgracefulsuch intervention of our time. Its also well nigh pointless to say so How many people reading this would disagree For Americans, Iraq is their worst foreign calamity since Vietnam although far more citizens of each country were killed than were Americans for the British, its the worst at least since Suez sixty years ago this autumn, though really much worse on every score, from political dishonesty to damage to the national interest to sheer human suffering. Although skeptics wondered how much more the very long awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted that military action was not a last resort that when the United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix said weeks before the invasion that he had not found any weapons of mass destruction and the items that were not accounted for might not exist, Blair wanted Blix to harden up his findings. The report also found that deep sectarian divisions in Iraq were exacerbated byde Baathification anddemobilisation of the Iraqi army that Blair was warned by his diplomats and ministers of the inadequacy of U. Learn Draw Game Characters. S. plans for Iraq after the invasion, and of what they saw as his inability to exert significant influence on U. S. planning and that there was no collective discussion of the decision by senior Ministers, who were regularly bypassed and ignored by Blair. And of course claims about Iraqi WMDs were presented by Downing Street in a way that conveyed certainty without acknowledging the limitations of the intelligence, which is putting it generously. Chilcot stops short of saying directly that the invasion was illegal or that Blair lied to Parliament, but he is severe on the shameful collusion of the British intelligence agencies, and on the sinister way in which Blairs attorney general changed his opinion about the legality of the invasion. Planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam were wholly inadequate, Chilcot says, and the people of Iraq have suffered greatly. Those might seem like statements of the blindingly obvious, as does the solemn verdict that the invasion failed to achieve the goals it had set for a new Iraq. It did more than merely fail, and not only was every reason we were given for the war falsified every one of them has been stood on its head. Extreme violence in Iraq precipitated by the invasion metastasized into the hideous conflict in neighboring Syria and the implosion of the wider region, the exact opposite of that birth of peaceable pro Western democracy that proponents of the invasion had insisted would come about. While Blair at his most abject still says that all these horrors were unforeseeable, Chilcot makes clear that they were not only foreseeable, but widely foreseen. Nor are those the only repercussions. Chilcot coyly says that the widespread perceptionmeaning the correct beliefthat Downing Street distorted the intelligence about Saddams weaponry has left a damaging legacy, undermining trust and confidence in politicians. It is not fanciful to see the Brexit vote, the disruption of the Labour Party, and the rise of Donald Trump among those consequences, all part of the revulsion across the Western world against elites and establishments that were so discredited by Iraq. And so how could it have happened By now the war has produced an enormous literature, including several official British reports, beginning with the Hutton Report of January 2. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction the following July after an inquiry chaired by Lord Butler, a former Cabinet secretary. While its criticism of named individuals was muted, it built up a dismal story of incompetence and official deceit. One member of Butlers panel, which took no more than five months to hear evidence and report, was John Chilcot, a retired senior civil servant who had worked in the Home Office and with the intelligence agencies. On June 1. 5, 2. 00. Gordon Brown, who had succeeded Blair as prime minister two years earlier, told Parliament that with the last British combat troops about to return home from Iraq, now is the right time to ensure that we have a proper process in place to enable us to learn the lessons of the complex and often controversial events of the last six years, and he announced a new inquiry, chaired by Chilcot. In those two years, everything had gone wrong for Brown, from continuing violence in Iraq to financial collapse, and his plain purpose was to push the matter aside and distance himself from his predecessor. One of the comic subplots of this unfunny story is the way that Brown, as throughout his career, always tried to avoid being associated with contentious questions or difficult decisions. For when they reach the scene of crimeMacavitys not there, nor James Gordon Brown if he could help it. Chilcot mentions that Brown would sometimes send Mark Bowman, his private secretary, to meetings concerned with Iraq in his place, in the hope he could avoid personal responsibility. So it was characteristic that when Brown first assigned Chilcot to lead the inquiry, it was to be held in camera, with as little publicity as possible. But parliamentary and public outcry put a stop to that, and Chilcot began his hearings in public view. They could all be followed, and then accessed online, and this has already been made use of by Peter Oborne for Not the Chilcot Report, a concise assessment, carefully sourced, that appeared before the report itself, and Tom Bower, whose Broken Vows is a full dress assault on every part of Blairs record. That includes a hair raising account of his wildly profitable financial career since leaving office, but the books most startling contribution to the Iraq debate is the number of attributed quotations from former very senior government officials who belatedly criticize Blair and a war which, it must be remembered, he had begun by ignoring all professional advice from anyone who knew anything at all about the subject. A Foreign Office authority on Iraq who pleaded with him that, from all previous experience, the invasion would likely be fraught and possibly calamitous, was dismissed by Blair Thats all history, Mike. This is about the future. Over seven years, much has been done to obstruct the inquiry.